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Abstract
This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature
and others’ actions in repeated games, and identifies a set of suffi-
cient conditions assuring that equilibrium actions converge to a Nash
equilibrium.
Players have each an utility function over infinite histories contin-
uous for the product topology. Nature’ drawing after any history can
depend on any past actions, or can be independent of them.
Provided that 1) every player maximizes her expected payoff against
her own beliefs, 2) every player updates her beliefs in a Bayesian man-
ner, 3) prior beliefs about both nature and other players’ strategies
have a grain of truth, and 4) beliefs about nature are independent of
actions chosen during the game, we show that after some finite time
the equilibrium outcome of the above game is arbitrarily close to a
Nash equilibrium.
Those assumptions are shown to be tight.
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1 Introduction
Consider a finite number of agents interacting simultaneously. Every agent
takes an action, and her payoff depends on her actions as well as others’
actions. Consider also that this interaction is repeated infinitely, and that
the payoff received by every agent depends on events beyond their full control
(called choices of nature). Such choices of nature can depend on any past
actions, or can be made during the first interaction only, or can simply be
independent of any actions by agents.
It is commonly assumed, in game theory, that all the players share a
common prior about the probability distribution from which nature makes its
choices. Such an approach is known as the Harsanyi’s Doctrine, introduced
by J. Harsanyi in [6].
The common approach to describe equilibrium outcomes of the above
game is to assume that the Harsanyi’s doctrine holds, and that every agent
maximizes her payoff with perfect foresight over others’ actions (Nash equi-
librium).
The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: what be-
havioral assumptions are needed to ensure that players, learning about their
environment (that is, about both nature and other players), eventually follow
the behaviors described in a Nash equilibrium?
The current paper considers a class of games where nature’ choices can
depend on any past actions by players (or also complete independence with
players’ actions). Individual payoff functions are defined over the set of
infinite histories, and are continuous for the product topology. For this class
of games, we identify a set of behavioral assumptions answering the previous
question, and we show that those assumptions are tight. We thus provide
a learning theory for the Harsanyi’s Doctrine and for the concept of Nash
equilibrium in such games.
Our framework has many features in common with standard models of
decision theory (see Kalai and Lehrer [8, 9], and Sandroni [11] for instance).
We consider a finite number of players engaged in a repeated game as above.
In every period, every player chooses an action from a finite set. The actions
chosen by all the players over time, as well as the choices of nature, determine
the payoff that every player receives along every infinite history. Every player
knows her payoff along every infinite history, without knowing the payoff to
the other players. The game is played with perfect monitoring ; i.e., every
player knows, at the beginning of every period, all past actions chosen by all
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the players and nature.
Our players are assumed to be subjectively rational ; i.e., the players have
subjective beliefs about both nature and others’ behaviors. Those beliefs take
the form of prior beliefs formed before the first period (not necessarily exact,
even though they may contain some private information). Those prior beliefs
are updated in every period in a Bayesian manner, according to available
information.
Every player is also assumed to maximize her expected intertemporal
payoff, given her subjective belief about nature and against her subjective
belief about other players’ strategies.
Within this framework, we show that the actions taken by the players
will become, for almost every infinite history, realization-equivalent to the
actions taken in a Nash ε-equilibrium, for ε arbitrarily small. Moreover, this
property occurs in finite time.
However, the above result relies on two important assumptions on the
beliefs of the players, presented next.
The first critical assumption is that the prior beliefs of every player about
both nature and others’ actions have a grain of truth; i.e., the beliefs of every
player assigns a strictly positive probability to every event that can occur
with strictly positive probability during the game.1
The second critical assumption is that subjective beliefs about nature are
not correlated with observations of actions taken by other players. That is,
every player does not infer anything about nature from the actions taken by
the other players. Moreover, we assume that every player believes that other
players choose their actions independently of each others.
In Section 5, we show that convergence fails when any of the last two
assumptions is relaxed.
Our result is related to that of Kalai and Lehrer [8]. In this last reference,
the authors consider a class of games without nature, and every player has
an utility function in the form of expected discounted sum of one-period
payoffs. Every player has belief in the form of a probability distribution over
opponents’ strategies, and maximizes her payoff function against her belief.
Provided that every player’s belief has a grain of truth, Kalai and Lehrer
show that the players’ behaviors become arbitrarily close to those described
in an almost-Nash equilibrium.
1In other words, every player assigns a strictly positive probability to every sequence
of actions that can be chosen with strictly positive probability by the players and nature.
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From a technical standpoint, our work should be regarded as an extension
of Kalai and Lehrer [8] for a larger class of games. Indeed, nature as described
here can be interpreted as a player maximizing a constant utility function,
and convergence towards Nash equilibrium obtains by taking the projection
of resulting behaviors on the actions space of actual players. (Thus, our
result also extends to settings without nature’ choices.)
Our proof is rather different in its approach to that in Kalai and Lehrer
[8]. Our approach allows to consider a larger class of games, and our topology
of convergence is stronger. We introduce the concept of stochastic subjective
equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of subjective equilibrium,2 as well
as the concept of self-confirming equilibrium.3 We show that, in finite time
and for almost every infinite history, players’ behaviors become identical to
behaviors described in a stochastic subjective equilibrium. Given the proper-
ties of (stochastic) subjective equilibria discussed in the above references, this
last result provides a second decision-theoretic foundation for the concept of
Nash equilibrium. We then show that any stochastic subjective equilibrium
is realization-equivalent to an almost-Nash equilibrium for accurate enough
beliefs. The proof of this last statement uses the continuity of the utility
functions to ensure convergence of payoffs as beliefs become correct. Finally,
eventual correctness of beliefs follows from the grain of truth assumption,
together with Blackwell-Dubins’ Theorem (see Blackwell and Dubins [3]).
In contrast, the proof in Kalai and Lehrer [8] relies on the discounting
nature of payoff functions, which allows them to narrow down the analysis
to a finitely repeated game and proves their result within this framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally describe the
class of games and the equilibrium concepts; in Section 3 we give the main
result; Section 4 contains some intermediary results; Section 5 presents the
counterexamples and concluding remarks; and finally all the technical proofs
are in the Appendix.
2As introduced in Kalai and Lehrer [8], see also Battigalli et al.[2] for a history and a
discussion of this concept.
3See Fudenberg and Levine [4].
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2 The model
2.1 The game
The model and some assumptions needed to obtain the main result of the
paper are now described.
Time is discrete and continues forever. A period is denoted by the letter
t (t = 1, 2, 3, ...).
There are n players (n ≥ 1), who plays forever.
In every period t (t ∈ N), every player i has a finite set of actions Σi. Let
Σ be defined as
n∏
i=1
Σi, the set of action combinations.
There is a non-empty and finite (or possibly countable) set S of states of
nature in every period.
For every st ∈ (Σ× S)t (t ∈ N), a cylinder with base st is defined to be
the set C(st) = {s ∈ (Σ× S)∞ | s = (st, ...)} of all infinite histories whose
t initial elements coincide with st. We define the set Γt (t ∈ N) to be the
σ−algebra that consists of all finite unions of cylinders with base on (Σ× S)t;
and Γ0 is defined to be the trivial σ−algebra. The sequence (Γt)t∈N generates
a filtration, and we define Γ to be the σ−algebra generated by ∪
t∈N
Γt.
Let H t be the set of all histories of length t (t ∈ N); i.e., H t = (Σ× S)t,4
and let H be the set of all finite histories; i.e., the set H =
⋃
t∈N
H t.
A (behavioral) strategy for every player assigns to every possible finite
history a (possibly randomized) action. We represent a (behavioral) strategy
for player i (i = 1, ..., n) as a function
f : H −→ ∆(Σi),
where ∆(Σi) is the set of all probability distributions on Σi.
Nature draws a state in every period, after every possible history. We
thus represent nature’ choices by a behavioral strategy
ν : H −→ ∆(S),
where ∆(S) is the set of all probability distributions on S. The state of
nature is not revealed to the players before they have simultaneously made
their choices of actions.
4The set H0 is defined to be the singleton consisting of the null history.
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The game is played with perfect monitoring ; i.e., the players know all
realized past action combinations actually played, as well as all the states of
nature drawn prior to the current period.
The state of nature drawn in the current period is revealed to the players
at the end of this period (without necessarily revealing the payoff of the other
players).
2.2 Realized play paths
The concept of infinite play path is now defined. What follows is described
in Kalai and Lehrer [8].
The notion of infinite ( or realized) play path represents the actual actions
chosen by the players over time, in the following sense.
Consider a (n+1)−vector of behavioral strategies f = (ν, (fi)i=1,...,n). The
null history h0 leads to the realized action combination z1 in the support
of f(h0). Defined recursively, in period t + 1, the players will choose the
randomizations f(zt), which will result in the action combination zt+1. The
vector (z1, z2, z3, ...) is called the realized play path. A realized play path,
finite or infinite, will be denoted by the letter z.
Denote by Af the support of f ; that is, the set of infinite play paths
assigned strictly positive probability by f .
2.3 Beliefs
The beliefs of the players about others’ strategies and the realizations of the
states of nature are now formally described.
Every player is assumed to have subjective prior beliefs about both other
players’ strategies and nature. Those prior beliefs are formed before the first
period of the game, and they will be updated in every subsequent period in
a Bayesian manner, according to available information.
Formally, the beliefs of player i (i = 1, ..., n) regarding the strategies of
the other players are represented by a n−vector of strategies f i = (f ij)j=1,...,n.
The belief f ij represents the belief of player i about player j’ s strategy.
Moreover, player i knows her own strategy (i.e., f ii = fi for every i).
The belief of player i about nature is represented by a behavioral strategy
νi : H −→ ∆(S), for every i (i = 1, ..., n).
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We consider the following probabilistic representation of beliefs. We as-
sociate a n−vector of strategies f and a choice of nature ν to a unique
probability measure µf,ν on the set on infinite play paths, as follows.
First, the measure µf,ν is defined inductively on the set of finite play
paths, and then uniquely extended to the set of infinite play paths.
Define µf,ν to be 1 for the null history. Consider now a finite history
h ∈ H whose corresponding realized play path is given by the vector z, a
vector of actions a ∈ Σ, and a state of nature s ∈ S. The value µf,ν(z, a, s)
is inductively defined to be
µf,ν(z).ν(s).
∏
i
fi(h)(ai).
So defined, we now uniquely extend this measure to (Σ× S)∞. Any finite
history h ∈ H, whose corresponding play path is given by z, is now consider
as being the cylinder C(z) (which is by definition the set of infinite paths
whose initial segment is q).
Define the probability measure µ˜f,ν as µ˜f,ν(C(q)) ≡ µf,ν(h) for every
such cylinders, and consider its unique extension to ((Σ× S)∞ ,Γ) given by
Caratheodory’s Theorem. The extension of the probability measure µ˜f,ν to
((Σ× S)∞ ,Γ) is the unique extension of µf,ν on ((Σ× S)∞ ,Γ).5
The above representation implicitly requires that the belief of every player
about nature is independent (in a probabilistic sense) of the actions chosen by
other players. Moreover, it also that every player believes that other players
choose their actions independently of each others.
In Section 5.1, an example is given showing that none of the current
results hold without those last two assumptions. The reader is also referred
to Section 5.2 for a discussion of those assumptions on beliefs and their
behavioral implications.
For sake of notational convenience, we shall denote by the same symbol
(f i, νi) the prior belief about the nature and others’ strategies of player i and
her updated beliefs obtained by iterated applications of Bayes’ formula.
5See for instance Kalai and Lehrer [8] for more details.
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2.4 Payoffs
The intertemporal payoff functions of the players are now described. Every
player has the utility function over the set of infinite histories
ui : (Σ× S)∞ −→ R.
We assume that, for every player i,
1) the function ui is continuous with respect to the product topology on
(Σ× S)∞ , and
2) ui is uniformly bounded above and below.
For any (n−)vector of strategies f , player i (i = 1, ..., n), whose belief
about the states of nature is νi, receives the expected payoff
U i(f, νi) = Ef,νi
[
ui(z)
]
,
where Ef,ν
i
is the expected value with respect to the probability measure
µf,νi induced by the strategies f and nature’ choices ν
i.
Moreover, every player is assumed to maximize the above expression,
namely her (subjective) expected payoff given her subjective belief about na-
ture’ drawings and against her subjective belief about other players’ strate-
gies.
The above specification of payoffs encompasses the case treated in Kalai
and Lehrer [8, 9] and Sandroni [11], where the payoff over infinite histories
takes the form of expected discounted sum of one-period payoff.
2.5 Equilibrium concepts
This section is devoted to defining the solution concepts that will be used
throughout.
First, the concept of best-response against others’ strategies, given a belief
about nature, is defined. Pick any player i (i = 1, ..., n), consider her belief
about nature νi and a (n − 1)-vector strategies f−i (this last vector can
represent either beliefs about others’ strategies, or actual strategies). For
every α ≥ 0, a strategy fi is a α−best response to (f−i, νi) if
U i
(
g, f−i, νi
)− U i (fi, f−i, νi) ≤ α,
for every other strategy g available to player i.
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Fix now α > 0. A Nash α−equilibrium is a n−vector f of strategies such
that fi is an α−best response to (f−i, ν) for every i (i = 1, ..., n), where ν
is the true probability of the states of nature. In particular, in any (almost)
Nash equilibrium, beliefs about nature and others’ strategies are exact.
The next notion allows to specify a concept of closeness, in a probabilistic
sense, between two vectors of strategies and for two particular choices of na-
ture. Define first, for ψ and ψ′ probability measures on the same probabilistic
space (Ω,F), the sup-norm to be
‖ψ − ψ′‖∞ = sup
A∈F
|ψ(A)− ψ′(A)| .
Definition 1 Fix ε > 0. The strategy profile (f, ν1) plays ε−like the strategy
profile (g, ν2) if ∥∥µf,ν1 − µg,ν2∥∥∞ < ε.
The concept of “playing ε−like” for two given strategies measures how
distant those strategies are from each other in a probabilistic sense. It is
preferable to approach this issue from a probabilistic standpoint, as explained
in details in Kalai and Lehrer [8, 9], even though the authors use a different
concept.
With the above definitions, it is now possible to introduce the concept
of stochastic subjective equilibrium (up to some constants), which generalizes
the concept of subjective equilibrium introduced in Kalai and Lehrer [8, 9],
and the concept of self-confirming equilibrium introduced in Fudenberg and
Levine [4, 5]. This notion will play an important role in the proof of the main
result of this paper.
Definition 2 Fix ε > 0. A stochastic ε−subjective equilibrium is a matrix
of beliefs (f j, νj)j=1,...,n , satisfying for every i (i = 1, ..., n):
i) the strategy f ii is a best-response to
(
f i−i, ν
i
)
, and
ii) the strategy profile (f jj , ν)j=1,...,n plays ε−like (f i, νi).
In words, in any stochastic subjective equilibrium, the following require-
ments hold: i) every player maximizes her intertemporal utility function
against her beliefs about others’ strategies and given her beliefs about na-
ture, and ii) the beliefs about others’ strategies and nature are realization-
equivalent (up to ε) to actual plays. No particular condition on beliefs about
nature is required in such equilibrium, for instance there is no need at this
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point for requirement ensuring that beliefs about nature are consistent with
available information and learning processes.
The above definition extends the notion of subjective equilibrium, as in-
troduced in Kalai and Lehrer [8, 9], in that uncertainty about nature is
added. The point of the paper is to show that, even when facing this type of
uncertainty, Bayesian players will chose (in finite time) a behavior described
by a Nash equilibrium.
3 The main result
In this section, the main result of the paper is stated and discussed. That is,
the set of sufficient conditions leading to convergence toward Nash equilibria
in finite time is given.
We first introduce a definition, which captures the concept of induced
strategy resulting from a given strategy after a particular finite history.
Definition 3 Consider a n−vector of strategies f , a period t ∈ N and a
finite history h ∈ H t. The induced strategy fh is defined as
fh(h
′) = f(hh′) for any h′ ∈ Hr (r ∈ N),
where hh′ is the history of length t + r resulting from the concatenation of
the history h (first) and (followed by) the history h′.
For any p-vector of strategies f˜ = (f1, ..., fp) (with 1≤ p ≤ n + 1), the
induced p−vector of strategies f˜h is defined as
f˜h =
(
(f1)h , ..., (fp)h
)
.
Before stating the main result of this paper, a notion in Measure Theory
is first defined. Consider two measures λ and λ˜ on the same measurable
space (Ω,P). The measure λ is said to be absolutely continuous with respect
to λ˜, denoted by λ + λ˜, if for every A ∈ P such that λ(A) > 0 it is true
that λ˜(A) > 0.
Finally, for any realized play path z and time t > 0, denote by z(t) the
truncation of z to its t first elements (thus z(t) ∈ H t).
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Theorem 4 Consider a n−vector of strategies f representing actual plays,
and for every player j the belief (f j, νj) with f jj = fj such that, for every i,
i) the strategy fi is a best-response to
(
f i−i, ν
i
)
,
ii) the beliefs are such that µf,ν + µfi,νi,
iii) player i updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, and
iv) the belief of player i about nature is not correlated with observations
of actions taken by other players.
Fix now any arbitrary α > 0. For µf,ν−almost every path z, there exists
a time T such that, for every t ≥ T , there exists a strategy profile f such that
1) f is a Nash α−equilibrium, and
2) f plays 0-like f .
The above theorem says that, if 1) players maximize their intertemporal
utility functions against their own beliefs, and if 2) beliefs are updated in a
Bayesian manner, as long as the independence requirement is satisfied and
the grain of truth holds, actual plays are realization-equivalent to an almost
Nash equilibrium in finite time.
One of the key to proving the above result is that, when Assumptions
i)-iv) are satisfied, along the realized play path actions satisfy the properties
of a stochastic (almost-)subjective equilibrium in finite time. Since also any
(almost) Nash equilibrium is an almost stochastic subjective equilibrium, and
since also any (almost) Nash equilibrium trivially satisfies Assumptions i)-
iv) above, Theorem 4 implicitly establishes some form of equivalence between
those three different concepts.
The assumptions used in Theorem 4 are discussed next.
Assumptions ii) and iv) above are tight, for instance the reader is re-
ferred to Kalai and Lehrer [8] for counterexamples violating any of those
assumptions, in the case where beliefs about nature are correct.
When all assumptions in Theorem 4 but iv) above are satisfied, Bayesian
players may not be able to learn anything about others’ strategies and/or na-
ture. In this case, resulting plays can become chaotic and convergence is not
to be expected. In Section 5.1, such an example is presented. The example is
taken from an early study by Jordan [7], and it is very similar to the frame-
work under study. The only difference is that players have now private and
partial information about the realizations of the states of nature. Using this
example, Kalai and Lehrer [8] show that, when n ≥ 3, convergence toward a
Nash equilibrium does not obtain even when players have exact beliefs about
11
nature. A counterexample, matching exactly the current framework, can be
easily derived from Jordan’s example.
In terms of possible extensions to Theorem 4, it is conjectured that
Bayesian learning is not the only (non-trivial) learning process for which
the above result holds. The characterization of all learning processes for
which convergence toward a Nash equilibrium obtains is an open problem.
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in the next section.
4 Proof and intermediary results
This section is devoted to giving the main line of the proof of Theorem 4.
Since the proof is technical, only the main intermediary results are presented
here.
The strategy of the proof of Theorem 4 goes as follows. First, it is shown
that beliefs and strategies satisfying Assumptions i)-iv) become, in finite
time, identical to an almost subjective stochastic equilibrium. Second, almost
subjective stochastic equilibria are shown to be realization-equivalent to an
almost Nash equilibrium when beliefs are accurate enough. Finally, it is
shown that beliefs becomes accurate enough, in finite time. Overall, this
leads to the approximation of initial strategies and beliefs by an almost Nash
equilibrium, as in Theorem 4.
The first proposition makes the link between strategies and beliefs satisfy-
ing Assumptions i)-iv) in Theorem 4, and the concept of (almost-) stochastic
subjective equilibrium. Its proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 Consider a n−vector of strategies f representing actual plays,
and for every player j the belief (f j, νj) with f jj = fj such that, for every i,
i) the strategy fi is a best-response to
(
f i−i, ν
i
)
,
ii) the beliefs are such that µf,ν + µfi,νi,
iii) player i updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, and
iv) the belief of player i about nature is not correlated with observations
of actions taken by other players.
For every ε > 0 and for µf,ν−almost every play path z, there exists a
time T such that, for every t ≥ T , the strategy profile
(
f iz(t), ν
i
z(t)
)
i=1,...n
is
stochastic ε−subjective equilibrium for the repeated game starting after z(t).
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The above result implies that, as long as Assumptions i)-iv) hold, ac-
tual plays and beliefs about others’ strategies along almost every path will
become, in finite time, a (almost-) stochastic subjective equilibrium.
The next proposition makes the link between (almost-) stochastic sub-
jective equilibrium and (almost-) Nash equilibrium. Its proof is given in the
Appendix.
Proposition 6 Fix any vector of beliefs (νj, f j)j=1,...,n. For every α > 0,
there exists a constant ε > 0 such that for every ε < ε, if (νi, f i)i=1,...,n is
a stochastic ε−subjective equilibrium, then there exists a strategy profile f
satisfying
1) f is a Nash α−equilibrium, and
2) f plays 0-like f .
The above result mainly states that, provided that beliefs are accurate
enough, every stochastic subjective equilibrium is an (almost-) Nash equilib-
rium. Given the conclusion of Proposition 6, and in order to prove the main
result, it is enough to ensure that beliefs become arbitrarily correct.
Arbitrary accuracy of beliefs follows from the next proposition, which
is the well-known and important result proved by Blackwell and Dubins in
[3]. It is a convergence result for conditional probabilities, stating that as
information increases conditional probabilities of two different measures will
convergence, as long as a requirement of absolute continuity is satisfied by
those two measures.
Before stating the result, let (Ω,F) be a probabilistic space, and (Pt)t∈N
be an increasing sequence of countable partitions of Ω, also called filter. This
sequence of partitions represents the information available to an agent in any
given period, and the set Ω represents the set of all the choices of nature.
For any w ∈ Ω and any period t, let Pt(w) be the unique set in Pt such that
w ∈ Pt(w). Its proof can be found in Blackwell and Dubins [3].
Theorem 7 Blackwell-Dubins (1962)
Consider two σ-additive measures µ and µ˜ on (Ω,F) such that µ + µ˜.
For µ−almost every w ∈ Ω and for every ε > 0, there exists a time T such
that
|µ(A|Pt(w))− µ˜(A|Pt(w))| < ε
for every A ∈ F and for every t ≥ T.
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With all the above intermediary results, we next move to the proof of
Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Fix the strategies f and beliefs (f i, νi)i=1,...,n such that fi = f
i
i for every i,
and satisfying Assumptions i)-iv) of Theorem 4. Fix any α > 0, and consider
also ε associated with α and (f i, νi)i=1,...,n by Proposition 6 and any ε < ε.
By Proposition 5, for µf,ν-every path there exists a time t0 after which
(νi, f i)i=1,...,n is a stochastic ε−subjective equilibrium. By Proposition 6,
there exists also a Nash α-equilibrium for the repeated game starting after
z(t0) that plays 0-like f .
Thus, we have found a period t0 such that the original strategies play
0-like a Nash α− equilibrium in the repeated game starting after z(t0).
The proof is now complete.
5 Concluding remarks
This section provides some extended discussions of the assumptions in The-
orem 4.
5.1 Independence of beliefs
In this section, an example is given showing that Assumption iv) in Theorem
4 cannot be relaxed. The game below is taken from Jordan [7], and it is
discussed in details in Kalai and Lehrer [8].
Consider two players engaged in an infinitely repeated game. The re-
peated game is similar to the one studied so far, with the difference that
a randomly generated (fixed-size) pair of payoff matrices (Ai, Bj)(i,j)∈I×J is
drawn by nature before the first period (the sets I and J are assumed to be
finite). A pair (i, j) ∈ I×J is drawn according to the probability distribution
Π. The probability distribution Π is common knowledge among the players;
that is, their beliefs about nature are exact.
Player 1 is told privately the realized value i, and player 2 is told pri-
vately the realized value j. Private information is not be revealed to the
other player at any point in the game. In this game, uncertainty about na-
ture faced by any player is on the private information owned by the other
player. Thus, the belief about nature of player 1 can be represented by the
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conditional probability Π( .| i), and similarly for player 2. All other assump-
tions but Assumption iv) in Theorem 4 also hold. Assume also that the
players maximizes the expected sum of discounted one-period payoffs of the
same game repeated over time (see Jordan [7] for more details).
Kalai and Lehrer in [8] show that, when the number of players is two,
convergence toward a Nash equilibrium obtains when players update their
beliefs about nature according to realized actions. However, when the number
of players is strictly greater than two, convergence fails.
The intuition of such a result is that, when n ≥ 3, players’ information
sets are no longer filters as more information becomes available, due mostly
to strategic attempt to hide private information and mislead others players
through own actions. Such behaviors immediately lead to an impossibility
of learning, and convergence as in Theorem 4 does not usually obtain.
5.2 Equivalent representation of beliefs and Kuhn’s
Theorem
Instead of representing the belief of player i about player j by the behavioral
strategy f ij , we could have represented instead player i
′ belief by a probability
distribution over the set of behavioral strategies available to player j. Kuhn’s
Theorem (See Aumann [1] and Kuhn [10]) applies to our setting, and ensures
that the two approaches above are equivalent.
Of importance is the assumption that every player believes that others’
actions are uncorrelated with each others. Informally, this last assumption
ensures that player i′ beliefs are represented by a measure product over beliefs
about others’ strategies. When this assumption is not present, it is easy to
find examples where convergence toward a Nash equilibrium does not obtain
(see for instance Kalai and Lehrer [8] page 1031 for a discussion of this issue).
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6 Appendix
The Appendix is devoted to proving technical results left aside earlier in the
paper. In what follows, we consider nature as an additional player maximiz-
ing a constant utility function. This does not yield any loss of generality.
6.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 is proved as follows.
Fix ε > 0. Consider now Γt to be the set of all cylinders up to time t
(t ∈ N) and their extensions to the infinitely repeated-game; that is each
element of Γt is the set of infinite play paths with the same basis of actions
up to time t. Clearly, each Γt is a partition of the set of infinite play paths,
and the family (Γt)t∈N is a filtration of this set.
Therefore, Theorem 7 applies to the probability measures µf,ν and µf i,νi
for every i and to the filtration (Γt)t∈N. It follows that for µf,ν−almost every
infinite play path z, there exists a time t such that for every s ≥ t it is true
that ∣∣µf,ν(.|Γs(z))− µf i,νi(.|Γs(z))∣∣ < ε
for every i. It follows that (f, ν)z(t) plays ε-like (f
i, νi)z(t), for every i.
Consider any realized play paths z described above and the corresponding
time t. By the Law of Iterated Expectations, the actions chosen by players
i after the history z(t), with the belief µf i,νi(.|Γt(z)) and taking as given
behaviors outside of z(t), are identical to the actions chosen after the history
z(t) in the first period with belief µf i,νi . Since fi is a best-response to (f
i, νi)
for every i, this implies that (fi)z(t) is best-response to
(
f i−i, ν
i
)
z(t)
for every
i.
The proof of Proposition 5 is now complete.
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 6
We first start with a technical lemma, stating that when two measures be-
come eventually similar for the sup-norm, the expectations of any continuous
functions according to those measures also become eventually similar. Con-
sider a complete metric space (Ω, d(.)), denote by Φ the σ−algebra generated
by the open ball of the metric and denote by Υ the topology generated by
the same open balls.
Lemma 8 Consider two positive and finite measures λ and λ˜, defined on
the measurable space (Ω,Φ).
Let u : Ω −→ R be a continuous function for the topology Υ, uniformly
bounded above and below.
It is true that ∣∣∣Eλ(u)− Eλ˜(u)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
x∈Ω
|u(x)| .
∥∥∥λ− λ˜∥∥∥
∞
.
Proof. Consider any such function u, any such measures λ and λ˜.
We have that∣∣∣Eλ(u)− Eλ˜(u)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
u.dλ−
∫
Ω
u.dλ˜
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
u.d
(
λ− λ˜
)∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
x∈Ω
|u(x)| .
∥∥∥λ− λ˜∥∥∥
∞
.
The proof is complete.
We next state another technical lemma, related to the notion of stochastic
subjective equilibrium.
For every i (i = 1, ..., n), define first ui = sup
s∈(Σ×S)∞
|ui(s)|, and then
u = max
i=1,...,n
ui.
Lemma 9 Fix any vector of beliefs (νj, f j)j=1,...,n. For every α > 0, there ex-
ists ε˜ > 0 such that, if (νj, f j)j=1,...,n is a stochastic ε˜−subjective equilibrium,
then for every i and for every behavioral strategy g such that Ag,f−i,ν ⊆ Af,ν,
the following holds: ∣∣U i(g, f−i, ν)− U i(g, f i−i, νi)∣∣ ≤ α.
17
Proof.
To prove the result, we first truncate the infinite repeated game to a
finitely repeated game, show that the result holds within this truncated game,
and then extends the result to the original framework.
Fix α > 0. Consider any strategy vector (νj, f j)j=1,...,n, any i and any
behavioral strategy g such that Ag,f−i,ν ⊆ Af,ν .
First, we have that for every i, the function ui is continuous for the
product topology. This implies that there exists a period t0 such that the
contribution of any strategy profile to the overall payoff of every player after
period t0 is no greater than
α
4 .
We restrict our attention to the truncated game of length t0 in the fol-
lowing way: we consider the original strategy profile up to period t0, and
leave payoff constant thereafter by extending the original strategy profile to
a constant arbitrary strategy profile after t0. By our previous remark, the dif-
ference in payoff between the original strategy profile and the newly formed
one is no greater than α4 for every player.
Formally, for any behavioral strategy q, we denote by qt0 the restriction
of q to H t0 , and by q−t0 the restriction of q to (H t0)c. To truncate strategies,
fix also any (dummy) strategy profile d such that dj(ht) = dj(ht′) for every
ht, ht′ and j. For any strategy profile p = (p1, ..., pn+1), define now for every
j the truncated strategy pj =
(
pt0j , d
−t0
j
)
, and let p = (p1, ..., pn+1).
Consider also the function
U˜ i(p) = U i (p) .
With this last function, only changes of individual strategy within the
truncated game of length t0 can affect the value of U˜ i.
In a first step, we show that
∣∣∣U˜ i(g, f−i, ν)− U˜ i(g, f i−i, νi)∣∣∣ ≤ α2 for any
unilateral deviation g from player i in the support of his initial strategy.
By applying Lemma 8 applied to U˜ i, we get for every i and g such that
Ag,f−i,ν ⊆ Af,ν that∣∣∣U˜ i(g, f−i, ν)− U˜ i(g, f i−i, νi)∣∣∣ ≤ u. ∥∥∥µg,f−i,ν − µg,f i−i,νi∥∥∥Ht0 , (1)
where ‖.‖Ht0 is the sup-norm restricted to the σ−algebra generated by H t0 .
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We next analyze the right-hand side of (1). To simplify notations, we
define for every s ∈ HT0 the function
Φi(s) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
1≤t≤t0−1
∏
j '=i
fj(s1, ..., st)(s
t+1
j )
− ∏
1≤t≤t0−1
∏
j '=i
f ij(s
1, ..., st)(st+1j )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
For every history s ∈ HT0 , we have by construction of the beliefs that∣∣∣µg,f−i,ν(s)− µg,f i−i,νi(s)∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣Φi(s). ∏
1≤t≤t0−1
g(s1, ..., st)(st+1i )
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Further, for any given ε > 0, if (νj, f j)j=1,...,n is a stochastic ε−subjective
equilibrium, we have for every history s ∈ HT0 s that∣∣∣∣∣Φi(s). ∏
1≤t≤t0−1
fi(s
1, ..., st)(st+1i ).
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Consider now the set of such histories assigned strictly positive probability
by fi, and denote it by F . The last inequality implies for every s ∈ F that
Φi(s) ≤ ε∏
1≤t≤t0−1
fi(s1, ..., st)(s
t+1
i )
.
Moreover, since Ag,f−i,ν ⊆ Af,ν , for every history s ∈ F it must be true
that g(s) > 0.
We next use the above remark to find an uniform upper-bound to the
right-hand side of (1). Define
ρ = min
s∈F
∣∣∣∣∣ ∏
1≤t≤t0−1
fi(s
1, ..., st)(st+1i )
∣∣∣∣∣
which is strictly positive, and let c denote the (finite) cardinal of H t0 .
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For every set B of finite histories of length t0, from the above we have
that∣∣∣µg,f−i,ν(B)− µg,f i−i,νi(B)∣∣∣ = ∑
s∈B∩F
∣∣∣µg,f−i,ν(s)− µg,f i−i,νi(s)∣∣∣
≤
∑
s∈B∩F
(
Φi(s).
∏
1≤t≤t0−1
g(s1, ..., st)(st+1i )
)
≤
∑
s∈B∩F
Φi(s)
≤ cε
ρ
.
Taking the maximum over such sets, we have that∥∥∥µg,f−i,ν − µg,f i−i,νi∥∥∥Ht0 ≤ cερ .
Setting ε˜ = αρ2u , and together with (1), the previous analysis implies that
if (νj, f j)j=1,...,n is a stochastic ε˜−subjective equilibrium then∣∣∣U˜ i(g, f−i, ν)− U˜ i(g, f i−i, νi)∣∣∣ ≤ α2 .
Moreover, since the contribution of any strategy profile after period t0 is
no greater than α4 , if (ν
j, f j)j=1,...,n is a stochastic ε˜−subjective equilibrium
then∣∣U i(g, f−i, ν)− U i(g, f i−i, νi)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣U˜ i(g, f−i, ν)− U˜ i(g, f i−i, νi)∣∣∣+ α2
≤ α.
We have thus derived the desired inequality, and the proof is now com-
plete.
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With the two previous lemma, we can now prove Proposition 6.
The proof goes as follows. Fix α > 0, and consider any vector of beliefs
(νj, f j)j=1,...,n.
We associate to (νj, f j)i=1,...,n the following strategy profile f :
1) for every h ∈ Af , define f i(h) = fi(h) for every i,
2) for every h /∈ Af , consider the shortest prefix of h, say h, such that
h /∈ Af and consider two cases:
i) if h corresponds to an unilateral deviation by player j from the support
of her strategy, define f i(h) = f
j
i (h) for every j -= i,
ii) if h does not correspond to an unilateral deviation, define f i(h) arbi-
trarily.
To prove Proposition 6, it is enough to show that there exists ε > 0
such that, if (νj, f j)J=1,...,n is a stochastic ε−subjective equilibrium , then its
associated strategy profile f is a Nash α−equilibrium.
We first claim that there exists ε1 > 0 such that, if (νj, f j)j=1,...,n is a
stochastic ε1−subjective equilibrium, then for every i,∣∣U i(f i, νi)− U i(f, ν) ∣∣ ≤ α
2
. (2)
Indeed, by Lemma 8, we have for every i that∣∣U i(f i, νi)− U i(f, ν) ∣∣ ≤ u. ∥∥µf i,νi − µf,ν∥∥∞ .
Define ε1 = 1u
α
2 . Then for every stochastic ε
1−subjective equilibrium
(νj, f j)j=1,...,n and for every i, the inequality (2) holds.
We next use the previous claim to get our result. In a first step we first
prove the property for every individual deviation in the support of (f, ν), and
then we extend this result to any arbitrary individual deviation.
By Lemma 9, there exists ε2 > 0 such that, if (νj, f j)j=1,...,n is a stochastic
ε2−subjective equilibrium, then for every i and for every behavioral strategy
g such that Ag,f−i,ν ⊆ Af,ν , the following holds:∣∣U i(g, f−i, ν)− U i(g, f i−i, νi)∣∣ ≤ α2 . (3)
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Define ε = min(ε1, ε2). Clearly, for every stochastic ε−subjective equi-
librium (νj, f j)j=1,...,n, for every i and every g such that Ag,f−i,ν ⊆ Af,ν , the
following holds:
U i(g, f i, ν)− U i(f, ν) = U i(g, fi, ν)− U i(f, ν)
+U i(g, fi, ν)− U i(f i, νi)
+U i(f i, νi)− U i(f, ν).
Combining (2) and (3) into this last relation gives
U i(g, f−i, ν)− U i(f, ν) ≤ α+ U i(g, f i, νi)− U i(f i, νi).
Moreover, since fi is best response to (f i−i, ν
i) for player i, the above
implies that
U i(g, f−i, ν)− U i(f, ν) ≤ α.
Equivalently, in terms of strategy profile f , for any i and g such that
Ag,f−i,ν ⊆ Af,ν we have just shown that
U i(g, f−i, ν)− U i(f, ν) ≤ α.
We now extend this result to any arbitrary behavioral strategy g.
Fix any player i, and any strategy g. Assume that Ag,f−i,ν differs from
Af,ν . This implies that there exists an history h such that g(h) is not in
the support of fi(h). By construction of f , in the subgames starting at any
such corresponding unilateral deviation by player i, all the other players play
according to f i−i. Since fi is best-response to f
i
−i in those subgames, player
i can improve upon g by playing in any such subgame according to fi, and
leave behaviors on Af,ν unchanged. We are therefore in the previous case,
and the result follows.
All together, we have shown that f is a Nash α-equilibrium. Moreover,
since as shown above there is no incentive to deviate from the original play
paths, the strategy profile f plays 0-like f .
The proof is now complete.
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